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1. INTRODUCTION
In 2005, Status of Women Canada and the Department of Justice
Canada jointly funded four policy research papers exploring the legal
and social ramifications of the practice of polygamy from the pers-
pective of its impact on women and children and gender equality.
Ours was the only paper to recommend the decriminalization of poly-
gamy.1 This recommendation caused a media frenzy, partly due to the
erroneous conflation of decriminalization and legalization which we
did not recommend
.2
As well, our recommendation likely prompted
the release of two more reports, one supporting decriminalization and
the other not.3
Polygamy is prohibited in the Canadian Criminal Code.4After
examining this prohibition, we concluded that it would not survive a
challenge based on the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.5
Waiting for a challenge to materialize simply prolongs the time dur-
ing which vulnerable women fear prosecution. Thus we recommend-
ed that Canada should repeal the prohibition.6
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However there is no indication that the federal government
intends to change its policy. Canada’s inaction has serious constitu-
tional consequences for three groups of women. I propose to argue
that failing to decriminalize polygamy harms (I) women in legal polyg-
amous marriages who want to immigrate to Canada; (II) women in
Canada who want to terminate their polygamous relationships; and
(III) women who oppose the legalization of polygamy in Canada.
Before elaborating these harms, I will summarize the Charter argu-
ment for decriminalization.
2. THE CHARTER CHALLENGE
All Charter arguments implicate five issues: application, standing,
rights, limits, and remedies. We developed all five issues in our paper
but here I will refer to only two: (I) rights and (II) limits.
I. RIGHTS
The rights-seekers would invoke the Charter to challenge the consti-
tutionality of the Criminal Code prohibition of polygamy in section
293, which provides:
S. 293. Everyone who
(a) practices or enters into or in any manner agrees or consents to prac-
tice or enter into
(i) any form of polygamy
(ii) any kind of conjugal union with more than one person at the same
time, whether or not it is by law recognized as a binding form of mar-
riage, or
(b) celebrates, assists or is a party to a rite, ceremony, contract or
consent that purports to sanction a relationship [that is polygamous] 
is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term
not exceeding five years.7
This section is very general, capturing formal and informal arrange-
ments. It captures cohabitation as well as marriage; and it encom-
passes both heterosexual and same sex relationships.
Given its generality, it is curious that there have been no report-
ed prosecutions under this section over the past sixty years. Moreover,
this is so despite the existence of communities such the ex-Mormons
in Bountiful, British Columbia, who flaunt their polygamous unions
and have been doing so for more than a century. Whatever the his-
torical reasons for not laying charges under the polygamy prohibi-
tion, apparently contemporary prosecutors hesitate because they
believe this prohibition violates the Charter right to freedom of reli-
gion. 
How, you might ask, does religion come into this situation?
It seems that virtually all practitioners attribute their polygamy – actu-
ally polygyny – to their religious beliefs, whether they are outcast
Mormons (also known as the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter Day Saints), or ultra-orthodox Jews, or practicing Muslims,
or whether they subscribe to traditional African religious cultural
beliefs. Thus, the rights seekers would be religious polygamists.
Their challenge would unquestionably fall within the broad
definition of freedom of religion that is set out in Big M Drug Mart.8
“The essence of the concept of freedom of religion is”, according to
Chief Justice Dickson, “the right to entertain such religious beliefs
as a person chooses, the right to declare religious beliefs openly and
without fear of hindrance or reprisal, and the right to manifest reli-
gious belief by worship and practice or by teaching and dissemina-
tion.”9 The Chief Justice elaborated this definition in Edwards Books,
stating: “The purpose of s. 2(a) is to ensure that society does not
interfere with profoundly personal beliefs that govern one’s percep-
tion of oneself, humankind, nature, and, in some cases, a higher or
different order of being.”10 Thus liberally defined, religion would prove
no hurdle to the challenge by religious polygamists.
Moreover these claimants should have no difficulty comply-
ing with the further requirement of sincerity of belief that was set
out in Syndicat Northcrest v. Anselem.11 In this decision, Justice
Iacobucci first rejects the notion that a claimant might have “to prove
that his or her religious practices are supported by a mandatory doc-
trine of faith” because that would require judicial interference with
the profoundly personal beliefs that Chief Justice Dickson had defined
as identifying religious dogma.12 Then he observes that a court “is
qualified to inquire into the sincerity of a claimant’s belief,” empha-
sizing “that sincerity of belief simply implies an honesty of belief.”13
Therefore, sinceIn fact, some of these religions promote polygyny as
a desirable, sometimes even required, way of achieving the promised
afterlife,. iIt seems inevitable that a court would conclude that the
polygamy prohibition violates religious freedom. But this would not
be the end of the litigation story because the Charter allows the gov-
ernment to try to justify infringing freedom of religion.
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II. LIMITS
To justify infringing the right to freedom of religion, the federal gov-
ernment would invoke the section 1 limitations provision of the
Charter. Using the Oakes test requirements, Canada would begin by
claiming that the crime of polygamy has a secular objective, namely
the protection of women and children, including protecting gender
equality. 
However the history of the polygamy prohibition reveals a dif-
ferent objective. Whether that history is dated back to the 13th cen-
tury in England when the church prohibited polygamy, or to the 1890s
when the first Criminal Code prohibited polygamy in order to keep
American Mormons out of Canada, the objective was religious. 
Since religion animated the enactment of the polygamy pro-
hibition, judges are unlikely to entertain gender equality as a “per-
missible shift in interest.”14 Moreover, even if Canada were to con-
cede that the purpose of the polygamy prohibition is religious, courts
cannot not accept this purpose as a justification for violating the
claimants’ right to religious freedom. In Big M Drug Mart, the Court
held that the religious purpose of the Sunday closing law not only
violated the right to freedom of religion, but also “could not be a
purpose that justified limiting the right”.15
Continuing with the Oakes test for the sake of completing the
argument, the second step is to comply with the proportionality
requirements. The federal government would have difficulty sustain-
ing the minimal impairment requirement. In general, courts are reluc-
tant to sanction absolute bans. More specifically, it is not easy to
make the case for an absolute ban when there have been no polygamy
prosecutions for sixty years. De facto, in other words, it seems obvi-
ous that minimal impairment could be achieved by decriminalization
without legalization (an approach that is well understood in the con-
text of marijuana). Thus we concluded that Canada would not be able
to justify infringing religious freedom. 
In sum, the polygamous religious freedom seekers would win
their challenge; the prohibition would be declared unconstitutional.
Polygamy would be decriminalized. The likelihood of this outcome
seemed so strong that we recommended not waiting for a Charter
challenge. Instead, the federal government should proceed forthwith
to repeal the law, saving women – especially immigrant women –
from the fear of being subject to an arbitrary change in prosecutor-
ial policy, should it ever happen.
3. THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF FAILING TO
DECRIMINALIZE POLYGAMY 
There is no likelihood that the current Canadian government will
decriminalize polygamy. Therefore, we need to assess the conse-
quences of maintaining the status quo. In particular, I propose to set
out the constitutional consequences for three groups of women: (I)
women in legal polygamous marriages who want to immigrate to
Canada; (II) women in Canada who want to terminate their polyga-
mous relationships; and (III) women who oppose the legalization of
polygamy in Canada.
I. CRIMINALIZING POLYGAMY HARMS WOMEN IN LEGAL
POLYGAMOUS MARRIAGES WHO WANT TO IMMIGRATE
TO CANADA
Consider the situation of married women who apply to enter Canada
as immigrants, refugees or even visitors. At the border, their mar-
riage is considered polygamous if they come from a country in Asia,
the Middle East or Africa where polygamy is a valid form of legal
marriage. For example, polygamy is legal in Morocco, Libya, Jordan,
Egypt, Indonesia, India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Singapore,
Cameroon, Burkina Faso, Gabon, and Bhutan. In many African coun-
tries, it may also be legal because the parties can choose between
having a civil marriage (no polygamy) or a customary marriage
(polygamy is valid). This choice exists, for example, in Uganda,
Zambia, Namibia, Guinea, Zimbabwe, Eritrea, Ghana, and South
Africa. 
Now consider more specifically the situation of two hypo-
thetical families, both in valid foreign polygamous marriages and
wishing to immigrate to Canada, the first family being a couple
while the second family includes more than one wife. Canadian law
treats the first family, the couple, as living in a valid foreign “poten-
tially” polygamous marriage. Because it is only “potentially” polyg-
amous, it can be converted into monogamy, rendering them admis-
sible as immigrants. However the second family, perhaps neighbours
of the first, would be classified at the border as being in a valid
foreign “actually” polygamous marriage. Because it is “actually”
polygamous, this family would be refused entry to Canada on the
grounds that an “actually” polygamous marriage would violate our
Criminal Code prohibition on polygamy.
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Given both families are in valid foreign polygamous marriages,
admitting the one and denying the other seems patently unfair.
Moreover, as we argued in the paper, it violates the private interna-
tional law principle of “universality of status” which should be given
effect to treat both families equally. Since they are at the border, nei-
ther family could invoke the protection of the Charter. Had they some-
how gained entry to Canada, however, they might invoke section 15(1)
of the Charter claiming ethnic or national origin equality rights, or
even marital status equality rights as an analogous ground. The out-
come of either ground as an equality rights claim is difficult to pre-
dict, and unlikely to survive a section 1 justification.
In fact, we researched the constitutionality of the Criminal
Code prohibition on polygamy precisely because of our concern for
immigrant women in valid foreign “actually” polygamous marriages.
Our argument does not extent to protecting the women who reside in
Bountiful, however. They cannot make a convincing claim to be in
valid foreign polygamous marriages because they come to Canada
from Utah where polygamy is illegal. 
II. CRIMINALIZING POLYGAMY HARMS WOMEN IN
CANADA WHO WANT TO TERMINATE THEIR POLYGA-
MOUS RELATIONSHIPS
Criminalizing polygamy harms women in Canada who want to ter-
minate their polygamous relationships in two ways. In the first place,
it creates a political environment that allows some governments to
deny spousal or cohabitation status to women. Women cannot access
the Divorce Act to terminate their polygamous relationships. Nor can
they obtain support or property rights on the breakdown of the rela-
tionship unless they live in Ontario or Prince Edward Island, the only
two provinces that have included polygamous relationships (potential
and actual) in their family law regimes. 
In the remaining seven common law provinces, potentially
polygamous marriages may give rise to support or property claims
on the basis of cohabitation. However, there is no case law, and no
suggestion that such claims would extend to relationships that are
actually polygamous. Moreover, in Quebec the situation is more dif-
ficult for women because cohabitation is not a basis for support or
property claims even for parties in monogamous relationships.
In the second place, failing to decriminalize polygamy means
that women face the threat of prosecution even though it has not
materialized for sixty years. They must hide their polygamous rela-
tionships for fear of a change in prosecutorial policy. Immigrant
women unfamiliar with the prevailing languages and cultures in
Canada are particularly vulnerable to pressures to conceal. Such secre-
cy means women must be circumspect when they report spousal abuse,
and when they claim custody of or access to their children. In addi-
tion, researchers are unable to conduct reliable research studies on
the impact and extent of polygamy in Canada.
Expressed in constitutional terms, the harms that result from
the denial of spousal or cohabitation status and the arbitrary prose-
cutorial policy are omissions that infringe women’s section 7 Charter
rights to liberty and to security of the person. While some omissions
have sustained Charter claims, it is unlikely that either of the suc-
cessful omissions cases – Vriend or Jane Doe – would serve as a
precedent for a successful section 7 Charter challenge to the denial
of spousal status or to the arbitrary prosecution policy as long as
polygamy remains a crime.
III. CRIMINALIZING POLYGAMY HARMS WOMEN WHO
OPPOSE THE LEGALIZATION OF POLYGAMY IN CANADA
The third major constitutional consequence of failing to decriminal-
ize polygamy is avowedly speculative. I suggest that Canada is enter-
ing a post-liberal state, one that will put women’s rights in jeopardy. 
To date, Canada has self-identified as a liberal (or secular)
state that keeps religion separate from politics, espousing toleration
as the hallmark of religious freedom. However, contemporary reli-
gious fundamentalism of all varieties – Christian, Muslim and Jewish
– appears to be producing a post-liberal state, one that I refer to as
post-secular.
Jurgen Habermas has depicted the post-secular state as one
that includes religious values in the political sphere.16 My view of the
post-secular state is less benign. I believe religious values will take
over politics and I fear the disappearance of women’s equality rights. 
More specifically, I fear the post-secular state will recognize
polygyny, not only by decriminalizing it, but also by legalizing it.
Women’s rights will consist of the right to be subordinated, unfree,
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sister wives. Worst case scenario, the Charter will be dissolved and
with it women’s citizenship and personhood.
Thus I call for a test case resolving the conflict between
women’s equality rights and claims of religious fundamentalism while
we are still in the liberal state.17 Polygamy presents the perfect oppor-
tunity for such a test case, on condition that we have already decrim-
inalized it.
If polygamy were decriminalized, whether by governmental or
judicial fiat, it would inevitably be followed by litigation initiated by
religious polygamists. They would invoke their Charter section 15
religious equality rights to challenge the new Civil Marriage Act def-
inition of marriage as “two persons”. 
Although these religious claimants might win at the section
15 stage, they should lose at the section 1 stage. Canada should be
able to argue successfully that the purpose of the new Act is to limit
marriage to monogamous relationships in order to protect women’s
equality rights. That we heard no discussion of this objective during
the debates surrounding adoption of this new Act should not provide
any impediment because there is no other way to explain the “two
persons” limit.
Therefore, while the Charter still has some life remaining, it
would be better to decriminalize polygamy and to use women’s equal-
ity rights to counter fundamentalist religious litigation for legal recog-
nition of polygamous marriages. The current Supreme Court of
Canada is more likely to accept Canada’s justification for limiting
civil marriage to two persons than is a post-secular Court adjudicat-
ing this issue in a post-secular world. Once religiosity overwhelms
the liberal state, our current revulsion against polygamy may under-
go a sea change.
4. CONCLUSION
The three groups of women whom I have identified are not the only
women impacted by the polygamy prohibition. However, their stories
are seldom told. Two factors may account for their silence. One is
the fear of the criminal consequences that could result from reveal-
ing that they speak from experiences within polygamous relationships.
The other is the rhetoric of political incorrectness that dominates con-
temporary discussions of polygamy. We have been socialized to believe
that, in a world with few universals, nevertheless it is a truism that
polygamy harms all women.
However, after studying existing international and domestic lit-
erature, Angela Campbell reports that the diversity of women who
live in polygamous marriages makes “it … impossible to draw a sin-
gle, unqualified conclusion as to whether polygamy harms women.”18
While some women suffer socially, economically, and health-wise
from polygamy, other women may benefit from it. What is needed,
she argues, is to target the specific factors that are detrimental to
women (abuse, poverty, coercion, health) rather than the practice of
polygamy on its own.
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